Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Forex Expert, AV Rajwade

Rupee creating a history every day and touching new lows, currency derivatives as a hedging tool has gained a lot of ground. The general definition of derivatives of course is that it is a contract whose value depends on the value of some underlying asset; because of currency derivatives, the underlying asset is a foreign currency rather than being a share in a company or a commodity, says Forex Expert, AV Rajwade.

The essential characteristic of a derivative is its value moves in the opposite direction to that of the underlying asset, he adds. An individual cannot do without derivatives if he or she is looking at hedging any currency exposure, explains Rajwade.

There are two types of players in this market, one who want to hedge exposures which arise out of their normal business, company having imports or exports or foreign currency borrowings, he says. The others, the speculators, there is also or at least there used to be until recently a third category of players which were the arbitragers who would continuously arbitrage between prices on exchanges and prices in the over the counter which is basically into bank and bank versus client market, he adds. So if there is a price difference between the two, the arbitrager would buy in one market and sell in the other, he says.




Below is the verbatim transcript of AV Rajwade's interview on CNBC-TV18

Q: We will start a little bit with the basics, what are currency derivatives, who is suited for this product?

A: The general definition of derivatives of course is that it is a contract whose value depends on the value of some underlying asset because of currency derivatives, the underlying asset is a foreign currency rather than being a share in a company or a commodity. So the basic definition remains that its value depends on the value of a variable, an asset like a currency. That is why you call them currency derivatives.

One basic difference between currency and equity derivatives, which we need to keep at the back of our minds is that currency derivatives are traded both on exchanges as well as what is known as over-the-counter (OTC) market that is between businesses wanting to buy or sell dollars and their bankers. So there is a very large OTC market and of course the exchange traded market has also grown, there are positive and negative features to both those markets.

Q: A lot of the viewers watching this show whether they are lay investors, students looking to study abroad, businesses of different sizes in the import/export business area especially would want to know who are currency derivatives suited for, who all can take advantage of it?

A: Essentially you cannot hedge any price risk except by using a derivative and for hedging a price risk, the derivative needs to have a particular characteristic namely its value moves in the opposite direction to that of the underlying asset. That is why we call it a hedge. So that what you gain or lose on one side, you lose or gain on the other. So you cannot do without derivatives if you are looking at hedging any currency exposures, which are arising out of your basic business.

The other users of currency derivatives or in principle only exchange traded currency derivatives would be those who want to you said investors, I would call them more bluntly as speculators trying to profit speculation by definition means that taking a longer short position in the hope of profiting from price movements. Now that is what they are glorified by a being called investors, but I think essentially they are speculators.

Speculation is a very high risk high reward game so essentially there are two types of players, one who want to hedge exposures which arise out of their normal business, company having imports or exports or foreign currency borrowings. The others, the speculators, there is also or at least there used to be until recently a third category of players which were the arbitragers who would continuously arbitrage between prices on exchanges and prices in the over the counter which is basically into bank and bank versus client market. So if there is a price difference between the two, the arbitrages would buy in one market, sell in the other.

Q: We hear a lot more about the rupee’s fall against the dollar and the movement there. But what are the different currencies which can be traded in the derivatives market in India?

A: Theoretically there are contracts in other major currencies like euro and yen and so on. But we need to keep two perspectives in mind. One, there is very little liquidity in those contracts. The basic liquidity in exchange traded derivatives market is in dollar rupee and that too for the nearer maturity one-three months. There isn’t much of liquidity in longer term maturities.

The second perspective which we need to keep in mind is that there is no such thing really as a euro-rupee or yen-rupee exchange rate. In fact that is a combination of the dollar-euro exchange rate in the global markets and dollar rupee exchange rate in the Indian markets. So it is a multiplication of the two. And it is not an independent variable. Once again that price is derived in a way you can call it a derivative of the dollar-euro or dollar-yen global market and dollar-rupee market in India.



Q: You were speaking about how there is a big OTC market for currency and currency derivatives in India and then there is currency traded on the exchanges. What is the reason for having two such avenues and should they not actually be combined into one?

A: There are two reasons why at least in the Indian context they cannot be combined together. One reason is that we have what is known as Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA). What it means is that any resident can do an actual currency exchange transaction only with an authorised dealer. You might be an exporter and I might be an importer, we cannot sell to each other. You have to sell to your bank, I have to sell to my bank. This is part of the FEMA. Also the interbank market, the jargon is authorised dealers in foreign exchange, that market is very tightly controlled by the central bank, while exchanges do not come directly under the purview of the central bank, they are regulated by Sebi.

The third thing, one corollary following from what I said is that all the exchange traded contracts are settled not by delivery, but as contract for differences, that is you exchange the difference in prices. You have bought dollars at Rs 60, settlement price is Rs 59, you pay Rs 1 and settle the contract. While in the OTC market, in principle, contracts are settled by actual exchange of one currency for another and any resident can undertake derivative transaction in the OTC market only if that firm, unlikely that individuals will have, that firm has a genuine underlying commercial exposure, so the export contract and import contract or a foreign currency borrowing.

The other major difference between the two markets is that like all exchange traded products the performance is guaranteed by clearing company. The clearing company is a subsidiary of the exchange. Nowadays, there is a move that they should become independent companies, but it is guaranteed by a clearing company. Transactions in the OTC market are not guaranteed, so there is what is known in the jargon as a counterparty exposure, the risk that the party with whom you are contracting to buy and sell might go insolvent, might fail before the contract matures.

You do not have that kind of a problem at least in principle on exchanged traded derivatives because they are guaranteed by the clearing company at the global level. You all know that there was a major financial crisis in 2008 arising out of mortgage derivatives. These are also derivatives, but of a different kind. Thereafter the group of 20 largest economies became active, they started meeting at the head of government level. Group of 20 has been in existence since earlier, but it was meeting at the Finance Minister level or central bank governor level, at the summit level that is at for instance Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is one of the members of the G20 Summit Group now.

One of the resolution of the G20 after the mortgaged derivatives crisis in western markets in 2008 has been that they are urging all member countries to move as much derivatives trading from OTC markets to exchanges, because exchanges through a system of initial and mark-to-market (MTM) daily margins they eliminate the counterparty exposures and through the margining system are able to guarantee the deliveries by the seller, in effect the clearing company steps in between the buyer of a contract and the seller of a contract.

Q: The question that arises is like you said that there is a thriving OTC market that we have. We have exchange traded derivatives available. For someone who is watching this show, who has an import export exposure of a very small nature, but obviously the currency fluctuations like we have seen in the second half of August impact them greatly. How do they decide how much exposure they should take on the exchange-traded fund (ETF), because like you said OTC the risk is there is no counterparty to guarantee, safeguard or eliminate that risk which is the first dharma of anyone who is hedging? How does it work?

A: As I mentioned earlier, under FEMA any resident can do a foreign currency transaction only with an authorised dealer. Authorised dealers are banks and the way banking has been supervised in our country, to the best of my knowledge last 17-18 years there has been no bank exposure as such. There the counterparty exposure is far more live issue for the banks on the company rather than for the company on the bank, but there is a downside to using derivatives in the OTC market. The downside is that there is no price transparency in the OTC market. At the same point of time, a bank dealer may quote price to you, one to me, one price for a million dollar trade, another for a USD 10,000 trade. While on exchanges there is a great deal of price transparency because you can see it on the screen what price you can sell or buy a particular contract.

The other basic difference between the two is that in the exchange traded derivatives market, maturities are fixed. Futures contracts for instance, they all mature on the last working day of the month that is when they are settled. So the maturities cannot be customised to suite the requirements of an exporter or importer.

For instance, my payment may be due on the 15th of a month. I can have a forward contract or an options contract with a bank which matures on 15th. If I want to do that same hedging on the exchange I will probably have to buy the contract which is expiring nearest to that date or something like that. So customisation is not possible. The cost of customisation in the OTC market is there is no price transparency and you could be paying a much higher margin. Margin means the wholesale market price and the retail market price difference, not margin in terms of initial margin and MTM margins.


Q: For the lay investor we have a student community, a tourist community, tourism agencies now with the rupee losing a substantial amount of ground especially over the last couple of weeks how do they hedge themselves if you want to go to the exchange do you need to have any particular profile or can any Indian resident take a position?

A: Unlike over-the-counter (OTC) market, as far as exchange traded derivatives are concerned, anybody can go to the exchange. All he would need is to pay an initial margin. There will be daily mark-to-market margin on that contract, so he will have to be prepared to pay the initial margin and the mark to market margin everyday but anybody can take that position.

In terms of the kind of people, the kind of end users mentioned for instance students going abroad or their parents or whatever, we need to distinguish between two types of exchange traded derivatives. First one is the Futures. Futures is like a forward contract except that it is standardised as to amount and maturity. The other is currency options. Options is a completely different animal.

In my teaching I often compare the Forward or Futures contracts as a Hindu marriage because once you have done those seven pheras round the agni, there is no way to get out of that contract. So, the negative side of the derivatives in the forward family, forward contracts futures, contract swaps etc, is that one cannot benefit from a favourable price movement.

For instance, yesterday if one bought Futures Contract at 63, now if tomorrow the rupee goes to 60 then one cannot benefit from that. One is locked into that 63 and one has to live with it. This is something totally different from an Option contract for which one pays an upfront fee for buying an Option.

What Option allows one to do is that if the price is worse than the strike of the Option, one can exercise the Option. If the market price is there, one can tear off the option so option has no opportunity cost but it has an upfront cost.

Upfront cost can also be reduced significantly by buying what is known as out of the money Options, that is where the strike rate is much worse than today’s market rate. Let’s say today’s market rate for the September end contract is 63, but I could buy an Option without much of a fee. There will be some fee which gives me the right to buy dollars at 66 which is much worst than today’s price. But then, our exercise is if it goes to 68, I do not exercise if their price is below 66 so Option has certain advantages.

In fact, Options need to be looked at by the end user like insurance. One pays a fee, buy an insurance, one buy car you have a comprehensive insurance. One has life insurance, if one is managing a factory, one has insurance against earthquake, riots, strikes etc so one pays a fee and one is protected against adverse happenings.

Q: It is available with the exchange, it is available in demat form, you can log into your account and trade it. How are things like contract size decided, margins decided and like we have in equities- in the money, at the money, out of the money, different strike prices available how does that work for currency?

A: The money Options means that the strike price is more favourable than the forward rate. The example that I gave was that Septembe-end Futures contract is trading at 63 now 61, if I have the right to buy dollar is at 61 now that is in the money strike, if it is at 63 it is at the money, if it is at 66 then it is out of the money.

Out of the money Options will cost much less than either at the money and the costliest of course will be in the money Options where the minimum price will be what is known as the intrinsic value that is the difference between the strike and today’s price. I think it depends on how much upfront money one wants to pay for buying an option.

Q: The question that is there in the top of mind for everyone is that the rupee has lost so much of ground to the dollar and there does not seem to be anything to suggest it will stop here it might go further for businesses how would you advice them because they would have obviously like over the counter requirement. Can they make a portfolio where they have over the counter exposure as well as exchange traded exposure so that the volatility hits them a little?

A: I would not advise them to run both the portfolios simultaneously. They should be looking at very closely particularly the SME segment is doing the hedge on the exchange primarily because of price transparency. There is except one fact that in the OTC market the small people get much worse rates than the Reliance ’s of this world. The small garment exporter from Tirupur gets a far worse price than a company like Reliance in Mumbai. That is the reality of that market.

While on exchange trading there is a price on the screen and one can buy or sell at the screen price. One thing they can look at very closely is doing the hedging part on the exchange but on the date of maturity of ones underlying exposure, cancel the hedge in the exchange and simultaneously do a trade in the OTC market because then the OTC trade will be in the spot market not in the derivative market so combining the two maybe useful. I think that is part of our corporate culture we haven’t really got around to the fact that Options are like insurance that one is much better off paying a fee and buying protection rather than trying to look at zero cost products which can turn out to have risk and pricing which one is not able to understand properly.


Monday, August 5, 2013

Its Manipulations and celebrations

If We Don’t Break Up the Big Banks, They Will Manipulate More and More of the Economy … 

 

Making Us Poorer and Poorer

Interest rates are rigged:

Derivatives Are Manipulated

The big banks have long manipulated derivatives … a $1,200 Trillion Dollar market.
Indeed, many trillions of dollars of derivatives are being manipulated in the exact same same way that interest rates are fixed: through gamed self-reporting.

Currency Markets Are Rigged

Currency markets are massively rigged.

Commodities Are Manipulated

The big banks and government agencies have been conspiring to manipulate commodities prices for decades.
The big banks are taking over important aspects of the physical economy, including uranium mining, petroleum products, aluminum, ownership and operation of airports, toll roads, ports, and electricity.
And they are using these physical assets to massively manipulate commodities prices … scalping consumers of many billions of dollars each year.

Gold and Silver Are Manipulated

The Guardian and Telegraph report that gold and silver prices are “fixed” in the same way as interest rates and derivatives – in daily conference calls by the powers-that-be.

Oil Prices Are Manipulated

Oil prices are manipulated as well.

Everything Can Be Manipulated through High-Frequency Trading

Traders with high-tech computers can manipulate stocks, bonds, options, currencies and commodities. And see this.

Manipulating Numerous Markets In Myriad Ways

The big banks and other giants manipulate numerous markets in myriad ways, for example:
  • Engaging in mafia-style big-rigging fraud against local governments. See this, this and this
  • Shaving money off of virtually every pension transaction they handled over the course of decades, stealing collectively billions of dollars from pensions worldwide. Details here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here
  • Pledging the same mortgage multiple times to different buyers. See this, this, this, this and this. This would be like selling your car, and collecting money from 10 different buyers for the same car
  • Pushing investments which they knew were terrible, and then betting against the same investments to make money for themselves. See this, this, this, this and this
  • Engaging in unlawful “Wash Trades” to manipulate asset prices. See this, this and this
  • Participating in various Ponzi schemes. See this, this and this
  • Bribing and bullying ratings agencies to inflate ratings on their risky investments

The Big Picture

The big picture is simple:
  • The big banks manipulate every market they touch
  • The government has given the banks huge subsidies … which they are using for speculation and other things which don’t help the economy. In other words, propping up the big banks by throwing money at them doesn’t help the economy
Get it? Break up the big banks, or they will continue to take over and manipulate more and more of the economy … increasing their profits while making everyone else poorer.

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

How to Trick Your Brain

waise toh indian kanjoos hotey hi hai phr bhi !!



If you’ve been making excuses for your lack of financial resolve, science may have your back: Believe it or not, researchers have identified a gene that could determine whether you’re good or bad with money. Specifically, the discovery has to do with self-control—or how some people are better able to resist temptation to make sound financial decisions.
According to a new report from Chase Blueprint, “Born to Spend? How Nature and Nurture Impact Spending and Borrowing Habits,” a specific section of the human brain lights up when we face a choice, such as, say, spending on something that we know we shouldn’t.
“Only 25% of us are born with the ‘good’ variant of that gene,” says report author Dr. Hersh Shefrin, a professor in the finance department at the Santa Clara University Leavey School of Business. “Some people are simply better than others at self-control, and neuroscientific studies have shed light on why this is the case.” (Note: These annoying people are also more immune to office birthday cake and mid-afternoon candy binges.)
But before you run off to get your gray matter tested, you should know that research also shows that, in this arena, nurture trumps nature—every time. In other words, there are proven ways that you can trick your brain into being smarter about money. Not convinced? Test out a few scientifically proven strategies to be a better financial version of yourself than you ever thought possible.

Adopt a New Mantra

How It Works: For this exercise, you’ll be using the help of a fancy scientific term known as a “heuristic,” which is essentially a rule of thumb that you live by to make decision-making easier. You probably already have many money heuristics that you abide by every day—whether you’re conscious of them or not.
Some examples: “I only buy used cars,” “always take your tax return to the bank” and “I deserve to shop online after a hard day at work.” As you can see, some heuristics are better for your finances than others.
Why It Works: If you’re conscious about adopting helpful heuristics, they can be powerful enough beliefs to override bad money behavior. Case in point: “Banking raises, if it becomes a habit, helps us avoid being tempted to spend the money, when we’d rather save it,” says Dr. Shefrin.
If you have bad money habits that you’d like to improve—from getting zinged by bank fees to overspending on gifts—come up with a specific heuristic to help you combat each one. Psychologists have found that we tend to feel poorly about ourselves for breaking the rule, even if we created it. Weird, but helpful.

Make Saving a No-Brainer

How It Works: In an experiment called Save More Tomorrow, employees were asked to save more for retirement by signing up for a 401(k), then voluntarily increasing contributions by a set amount every few months. The results? Over the course of 28 months, the average participant’s savings rate jumped from 3.5% to 11.6%.
Why It Works: By having the money come directly out of their paychecks, before it hit their bank accounts, the participants never missed the money. Essentially, they bypassed the portion of their brains that loves temptation and activated the slow-thinking region that promotes self-control.
While they could opt out of upping their contributions at any time (so they didn’t feel trapped), what happened instead was a phenomenon called “status quo bias.” In layman’s terms, it’s a tendency to keep doing what we’ve always done. In this case, it benefited the people in the experiment because they continued to participate in the plan.
You, too, can apply this bit of trickery to any savings goal. Simply pick a start date, set calendar alerts for set times when you want to up your contributions, and then sit back and watch your balance grow. Certain banks and brokerages will even automate the process for you by letting you program a percentage amount by which you can increase your contributions over time.

Pick a Plan and Stick to It

How It Works: Have debt to pay off? There’s a way to outsmart your brain here too. In another experiment called Borrow Less Tomorrow (it came to be after Save More Tomorrow was such a smashing success), people with debt were put on a three-pronged program to help them pay down their balances.
First, they met with a member of the program’s staff who advised them on several different repayment strategies, including “accelerated” plans that would up the amount that they paid off by a little each month. Then they corralled a buddy (or three!) who’d send them monthly reminders to keep them on track. At the end of 12 months, 51% of the people who’d adopted a debt repayment plan were on track—and 41% of them had used an accelerated plan to pay down their debts faster.
Why It Works: Researchers chalk the success up to three factors: choosing a particular plan, committing to the idea of allocating a certain amount to repayment each month and engaging peer support (read: those telephone or email reminders from friends). Once again, effort trumped any underlying genetics: “Good habits do end-runs around the parts of our personality that give in to temptation,” explains Dr. Shefrin. It’s easy to emulate this on your own: LearnVest’s Money Center allows you to set a financial goal and then calculate how long it will take to reach it, depending on how much you put toward that goal each month.

Spend on Your Best Self

How It Works: To make your money behave the way you want it to, you need to first decide who you are and then make your budget obey that identity. Perplexed? Let us explain.
It can be hard to just “save” blindly or “not spend so much” when you don’t have a larger goal driving you. But if you’re someone who believes that providing for your children is important (like this mom, who says paying for her daughter’s college is her ultimate financial goal), you’ll be a lot more likely to make financial decisions align with your principles.
Accomplishing this is a cinch: You can break down your budget into three essential categories based on the 50/20/30 rule—but you have free will when it comes to creating and naming the folders that describe your saving and spending. So if owning a house is important to you, designate a “dream home” savings folder. If being physically fit is your top priority, christen an exercise savings folder to reflect that goal.
Why It Works: “If we identify ourselves as responsible, and take pride in living up to the virtues associated with that identity, then we activate reward centers in the brain associated with goal achievement,” says Dr. Shefrin.
The other helpful factor: Humans have a desire to see themselves in a certain light, and we’ll reject anything that conflicts with that reality. It’s a phenomenon known as identity reinforcement theory. In other words, you can override bad money behavior by adopting good habits that reflect the person you really want to be.

Capital banks

There is an active debate on how much capital banks should have.




Yet establishing an 'optimal' level of bank capital is more art than science. Any conclusion is model-specific and contains a degree of judgement. The purpose of this column is to contribute to the debate by offering one more benchmark.
Basel III imposes on banks an equity-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio (risk-weighted capital) of between 8 and 12%. This is comprised of the 4.5% basic ratio, 2.5% conservation buffer, 2.5% countercyclical buffer (in upturns), and up to 2.5% surcharge on systemic banks. Some countries have higher capital requirements. Singapore imposes a 2% surcharge over Basel; the Vickers proposals in the UK call for a 3% surcharge; and Switzerland requires that its international banks hold extra 6% capital, bringing total capital requirements to 18-19%.
Historically, banks held more capital than they do today. In the early 20th century the leverage (equity-to-total-assets) ratio for US and UK banks was around 8-12% (Miles 2011). To convert leverage ratio into risk-weighted capital, the rule of thumb is to multiply it by 2; the average risk weight is 0.5 (King 2010, La Lesle and Avramova 2012). So the 8-12% leverage could correspond today to 16-24% risk-weighted capital. However that period is of limited guidance as banks were less diversified and did not have access to a well-developed safety net or deposit insurance. Leverage ratios for US and UK banks in 1950-70s were about 6.5%, corresponding to 13% risk-weighted capital. This is close to the Basel III targets.
It is hard to quantify precisely the recent, pre-crisis evolution of bank capital, because banks understated risk weights and held many exposures off-balance sheet. But a number of major global banks had leverage of only 3%, which under average risk weights would correspond to 6% risk-weighted capital. This is about a half of where they should be to satisfy Basel III.
In the academic community, many argue that banks may need significantly more capital. In a 2010 letter to Financial Times, signatories suggested that “if a much larger fraction, at least 15%, of banks’ total, non-risk-weighted, assets were funded by equity, the social benefits would be substantial.” This target is high; 15% leverage corresponds to 30% risk-weighted capital.

An exercise based on losses in past crises suggests up to 18% capital

Figure 1 plots the distribution of non-performing loan ratios in banking crises in OECD countries, according to Laeven and Valencia (2012). In most events, ratios were modest; the median is 6%. Including more extreme events, to comprise 85% of episodes (24 out of 28), gives non-performing loans of up to 19%. Episodes with even higher non-performing loans represent extreme, twin (banking-currency) crises, i.e. Korea in 1997, Turkey in 2000, and Iceland in 2008. Twin crises are rare in advanced economies; their risk can be reduced by controlling currency mismatches in banks and corporations. So we can take 19% as a historic upper bound for non-performing loan ratio in non-twin banking crises in advanced economies.
Figure 1. Non-performing loan ratio during banking crises in OECD countries

To obtain loan losses, the non-performing loan ratio should be adjusted for loss given default. There is little systematic data on loss given default. We use the estimate of Schuermann (2004) that the mean loss given default on senior secured debt in US over 1970-2003 was on the order of 50%. This means that 19% non-performing loan ratio corresponds to 9.5% loan losses. Around 1% of that can typically be absorbed by earlier provisioning. (In Spain, dynamic provisioning was able to achieve buffers of 1.5%; Saurina 2008.) This leaves loan losses net of provisions of 8.5%.
Bank equity may need to be somewhat higher than 8.5% when system-wide average losses are asymmetrically distributed among banks (i.e. some banks realise higher losses), or because banks need extra capital to continue operating after absorbing the losses. But there is also a powerful argument why equity could be somewhat lower; equity reduces bank risk-taking incentives, so well-capitalised banks are less likely to engage in strategies that lead to severe banking crises in the first place.
On balance, with a margin of safety, one could suggest that a 9% equity-to-total-assets ratio (leverage), corresponding to 18% equity-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio (risk-weighted capital) would offer banks enough capital to fully absorb most asset shocks of magnitudes observed in banking crises in OECD countries over the last 50 years.
We emphasise that this is a conservative estimate. For example, if one believes that higher bank capital has strong incentive effects, the appropriate capital target could be lower, say, 15%.
The estimate can be seen as good news. While conservative, it is not too far from the Basel III’s highest 12% ratio. It is very close to the Swiss capital requirements. And it suggests that more extreme proposals – such as those of 30% risk-weighted capital – are overkill.
It is useful to note some caveats.
  • As with any estimate, there is significant model uncertainly. Losses in past crises can be a poor predictor of future losses, as bank risks can increase or decrease due to financial innovation.
  • The estimate is based on losses on loans, not on the rest of bank balance sheet. 'The rest' today comprises about 50% of assets of an average large bank, half in trading assets and securities and half in cash and interbank claims (King 2010). Trading securities can have larger losses, while cash and interbank claims be safer than loans during crises. One could refine the analysis to arrive at a more precise estimate of capital needs by modelling bank asset structure with associated crisis losses and risk weights in more detail.
  • We base the estimate on data for OECD countries (relevant for advanced economies). Historic losses in banking crises in emerging and developing economies were larger, due to weaker resolution tools and legal environment.
  • We assume that all absorption capacity has to be provided by bank capital – equity. In practice, some can be provided by contingent capital – a debt security that contractually converts into equity well ahead of bank distress. Some recent policy initiatives focus on 'bail-inable' debt, which the government can haircut during crises (Zhou et al. 2012). But haircutting bank debt risks exacerbating a crisis, so it is unclear whether relying on the absorption capacity of bail-inable debt is optimal from an ex ante perspective.
  • The estimate is a target for bank capital at the peak of the cycle. When the economy is slow or contracting, bank capital requirements could be lowered to facilitate lending and recovery.
Overall, we hope that notwithstanding these caveats this simple calculation may provide a useful benchmark for thinking about optimal capital levels.

The costs of higher capital are modest in steady state, but adjustment is a challenge

If one uses the losses in past crises as a gauge for 'optimal' bank capital, what would be the cost associated with higher capital levels?
There are two ways to calculate the effect of higher capital on the bank’s cost of funding. One is to keep the costs of bank’s debt and equity exogenous. Assume that the required return on bank equity is 15%, and the cost of bank debt is 5% (3% net of tax shield). Then an increase in the bank’s risk-weighted capital ratio by one percentage point, equivalent to a shift of 0.5% of funding from debt to equity (given the average risk weight of 0.5), would increase the weighted average cost of capital by six basis points. This type of analysis is used by Elliott 2009 and BCBS 2010; it produces the highest possible costs.
Another way is to base on the Modigliani-Miller proposition that the banks’ overall cost of funding should not increase with higher equity (as equity and debt become safer and cheaper; Admati and Hellwig 2013), except for the tax shield effect. Then – under similar assumptions – an increase in the bank’s risk-weighted capital ratio by one percentage point would increase the weighted average cost of capital by just one basis point. Under additional departures from Modigliani-Miller, the cost can be somewhat higher: Kashyap et al (2010) suggest up to 2.25 basis points for a one-percentage-point increase in risk-weighted capital.
Thus, the costs of higher bank capital in steady state are modest. An increase in bank capital requirements by six percentage points from the Basel’s 12% to our very conservative 18% would increase the banks’ cost of funding (and hence the lending rates) by about 13.5 basis points under the Kashyap et al (2010) estimate. And in the case where Modigliani-Miller does not hold (exogenous costs of debt and equity) the increase would be 36 basis points.
While the high level of bank equity is not prohibitively costly in steady state, the costs of raising bank capital quickly may be substantial. Issuing new equity has underwriting and adverse selection costs. Reducing dividends to boost retained earnings may lead to declines of bank capitalisation and weaken confidence. But the main risk is that banks can increase capital ratios by cutting lending. Aiyar et al (2013) show that about a half of banks’ short-term response to an increase in capital requirements occurs through a contraction of balance sheet. This means, for example, that an increase in capital requirements from 10% to 11% (by one percentage point, equivalent to 10%) could reduce lending associated with the highest risk weights (e.g. non-financial corporate lending) by as much as 5%. So the adjustment cost cannot be neglected.
This suggests that banks should increase their equity over a period of time, backloaded to the time when economic growth accelerates. For Europe, this may be another argument for the European Stability Mechanism support to banks in distressed countries (Dell’Arricia et al 2013).
Author's note: The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the IMF. I thank Charles Calomiris, Stijn Claessens, Luc Laeven, Srobona Mitra, and others for helpful comments. All errors are mine.

References

Admati, A and M Hellwig (2013), The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It, Princeton University Press.
Aiyar S, C Calomiris and T Wieladek (2013), "Does Macro-pru leak?" Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming.
BCBS [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision] (2010), "An assessment of the long-term economic impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements".
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Tuesday, July 30, 2013

Telangana

Telangana has been backward for centuries. It never came under the British
but was ruled by the Nizam of Hyderabad. He did set up a few factories and
a textile mill in Warangal in collaboration with the French.  However,avenues

of employment were few and exploitation abounded, owing to the nature of 
feudalism in the region.The most crucial infrastructure element, an irrigation 
system, was never developed systematically in Telangana,although both the
Krishna and theGodavari flowed through it. By contrast, the coastal Andhra
region aggressively lobbied for and got a garland of canals that took river 
waters deep into the east and west Godavari districts. The Telangana region
became a stronghold of the Communist Party of India and it was here that 
armed struggle first cameup in India.In 1956, when Fazal Ali presented his
report on the linguistic reorganisation of states, Telangana (called Hyderabad 
state) first refused to integrate and then negotiated long and hard on the terms
on which it would become a part of Andhra Pradesh (AP). What Nehru called 
a “gentleman’s agreement” was drawn up, in which Telangana would be recog-
nised as “virtually” a separate state.
This didn't happen and the movement for a separate state continued to simmer.
M Channa Reddy cynically fanned the flames of a separate Telangana 
movement in the late 1960s and 1970s that led to bloody riots but ensured 
a permanent stranglehold of  the Congress over AP. When N T Rama 
Rao founded the Telugu Desam, the Congress found itself turfed out 
of coastal Andhra but retained its base in Telangana and Rayalaseema.The
Telangana Rashtra Samiti was formed by K Chandrasekhar Rao in the 
winter of 2001. Rao quit as deputy speaker of the Assembly and resigned
 from the TDP. In the 2001 local body elections in AP, the TRS took off so 
strongly that the TDP got just 10 of the 20 zilla parishads. On this, the 
Congress quickly struck a deal with the TRS for the Lok Sabha elections.
In the 2004 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections, which the TRS fought in 
alliance with the Congress, the party bagged 26 assembly and five Lok Sabha 
seats. When it found the Congress equivocating on the issue of Telangana,
 the TRS broke away from the alliance. However, the base of the TRS had 
shrunk. Now, the eye of the Congress is on that base, which it hopes to 
get with the announcement of a new state, believing it has elbowed out the TRS

Sunday, July 28, 2013

Bengal Famine by Amit kumar

The year 2013 marks the 70th anniversary of the Bengal Famine which resulted in the death of an estimated 1.5 to 3 million children, women and men during 1942-43. A constellation of factors led to this ega-tragedy, such as the Japanese occupation of Burma, the damage to the aman(kharif) rice crop both due to tidal waves and a disease epidemic caused by the fungus Helminthosporium oryzae , panic purchase and hoarding by the rich, failure of governance, particularly in relation to the equitable distribution of the available food grains, disruption of communication due to World War II, and the indifference of the then U.K. government to the plight of the starving people of undivided Bengal. Famines were frequent in colonial India and some estimates indicate that 30 to 40 million died out of starvation in Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Bengal during the later half of the 19th century. This led to the formulation of elaborate Famine Codes by the then colonial government, indicating the relief measures that should be put in place when crops fail. The Bengal Famine attracted much attention both among the media and the public, since it occurred soon after Mahatma Gandhi’s “Quit India” call to the British in 1942. Agricultural stagnation and famines were regarded among the major adverse consequences of colonial rule. I wish to narrate the impact of the twin developments, namely, Bengal Famine on the one hand, and the “Quit India” movement on the other, on the minds of students like me. I was studying at the University College, Thiruvananthapuram, during 1940-44, when gruesome pictures of starving children, women and men on the streets of Kolkata and in other parts of Bengal appeared in The Hindu , the Statesmanand other newspapers. The goal of my University education was to get into a medical college and equip myself to run a hospital in Kumbakonam left behind by my father, M.K. Sambasivan, who died at a young age in 1936. The transformational factor was procurement of food grains from farmers at a minimum support price fixed on the basis of the advice of the Agricultural Prices Commission. A small government programme titled “High Yielding Varieties Programme” became a mass movement owing to the enthusiasm generated among farm families both by the yield revolution and the opportunities for assured and emunerative marketing. Wheat production has continued to rise since 1968 and has now reached a level of 92 million tonnes. A third important factor was the synergy brought about among scientific know-how, political do-how and farmers’ toil, often referred to as the “green-revolution symphony”. While we can be legitimately proud of our progress in the production of wheat and rice and other cereals and millets leading to the commitment of government of over 60 million tonnes of foodgrains for implementing the provisions of the MAY  2013 Food Security Bill, there is no time to relax since dark clouds are gathering on the horizon.There would be three threats to the future of food production and our sustained capacity to implement the provisions of the Food Security Bill. First, prime farmland is going out of agriculture for non-farm purposes such as real estate and biofuels. Globally, the impact of biofuels on food security has become an increasing concern. A High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) of the World Commission on Food Security (CFS), which I chair, will be submitting a report shortly on Biofuels and Food Security. In this report, we are pointing out that if 10 per cent of all transport fuels were to be achieved through biofuels in the world, this would absorb 26 per cent of all crop prduction and 85 per cent of the world’s fresh water resources. Therefore, it will be prudent for all countries to accord food security the pride of place in the national land use policy. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Bengal Famine, we should derive strength from the
fact that we have so far proved the prophets of doom wrong. At the same time, we need to redouble our efforts to help our farmers to produce more and more food and other commodities under conditions of diminishing per capita availability of arable land and irrigation water. This will be possible if the production
techniques of the evergreen revolution approach are followed and farmers are assisted with appropriate public policies to keep agriculture an economically viable occupation. This is also essential to attract and retain youth in farming. If agriculture goes wrong, nothing else will have a chance to go right. From the very beginning it has been taken  for granted that industrialisation is the only panacea for development. Our  economic policies were so designed that agriculture was categorised as ‘unskilled labour’. Urban areas and industrial enterprises received huge government  subsidies, at the cost of agriculture. As a consequence, small farmers and  rural labour suffered the inevitable impoverishment. The Green Revolution, sponsored by big industry, was imposed on India. Under the regime, ‘improved’ seeds were produced that survived only on a strong  dose of chemicals, fertilisers and pesticides. During a study on wheat  production in five states, including Madhya Pradesh, it was revealed that the  average cost of production per hectare, which was Rs 561 in the decade  19811990, has risen to a whopping Rs 7,673.70. As a result, traditional farming suffered  an untimely demise; agriculture became a ‘for markets, (controlled), by  markets’ enterprise. Small farmers got trapped in debt, and easily cultivable  and nutritious coarse pulses and oilseeds became unpopular. Modern, mechanised forms of farming made a huge population of rural labour redundant. Now there is the scourge of a Second  Green Revolution in the form of contract farming and ‘industrial-farming’. In  this age of biofuel, cane, corn and other such produce are being intensively cultivated  for fuel purposes only. Agriculture is being controlled by MNCs and large  corporations. How can food security be guaranteed by grabbing natural resources  like water and land from small, vulnerable farmers for the purpose of handing  them over to big industries? The National Food Security Bill serves only to register the fact that hunger is a real cause for concern, as in its present form, the bill is not adequately endowed with a vision to address the structural causes of India’s food and nutritional insecurities. Three basic issues need to be highlighted. First, the bill dwells on targeting vis-à-vis universalisation, re-invoking the contentious BPL-APL issue (‘priority’ and ‘non-priority’ households). Intended benefits will be provided to people based on these categories. It is a well-known fact that successive governments have failed to identify the poor. As a result, a large part of the country’s population continues to struggle with hunger in various forms. In such a grim scenario, the government should be talking about universalisation, which is an integral part of the fundamental right to life. Second, the bill provides for the supply of 7 kg of subsidised foodgrain per person per month to ‘priority’ households, whereas a person needs 14 kg a month to fulfil her basic food requirements. Third, the proposed entitlements do not deal with the problem of nutritional insecurity. People in India suffer undernourishment mainly due to protein and fat deficiencies. To cope with this problem, the government should have included pulses (to compensate for protein) and edible oil (to replenish fat). The preamble of the bill says: “…the Supreme Court of India has recognised the right to food and nutrition as integral to the right to life…” Today development is understood only in the narrow sense of economic growth and GDP. Successive governments have not stepped out of this familiar paradigm to address improvements in living standards and enhancement of people’s wellbeing. How can weServices programme with a plan to spend Rs 80,000 crore in the next five years; the midday meal scheme is already in place. We have a 17 crore under-6 child population, 45% of which is undernourished. But we barely spend Rs 1.62 per child per day on their growth and nutrition. The fact of the matter is that the private food market will lose out on profits due to this legislation, and there will be a control over inflation. The market finds this unacceptable Take the example of the second and third quarter of 2011-12. While the growth rate came down to 6.8%, food inflation also declined from 16% to 1.7%. There is an argument that it would be better for the government to focus on productivity enhancement rather than on doling out subsidies at the expense of taxpayers. But these two things are not mutually exclusive, they are complementary. India is not a food-deficit country; we produce surplus foodgrain, we throw it in the sea, we export it. But, for various reasons, it does not reach our hungry people. Part of this discussion is linked to public procurement and a minimum support price. If the government stops subsidising agriculture, profit-makers will benefit and consumers will have to pay high prices. Take the example of pulses. We pay Rs 36 per kg as the minimum support price to the farmer for tur dal, but the market price was Rs 110 some time ago. There is an urgent need to ensure maximum public procurement, and this can only be done and applied through the public distribution system. The second aspect deals with policy. For the last 20 years, per capita food production in India has been stagnant at around 460 grams per person per day. Although pulses are a key source of protein, their availability has gone down from 70 grams per day in the 1960s to 42 grams in recent times. We adopted new technologies — hybrid seeds, chemical fertiliser and pesticides — in order to increase agricultural production. Punjab sacrificed its community techniques and blindly used chemicals resulting, finally, in steep declines in soil fertility.The important point is that while  our budget grew 5,000 times its inaugural size, food production grew by a measly  400% over the same period. In rural India today, 23 crore people are  under-nourished,
and 50% of children fall victim to malnutrition. Every third  Indian in the age-group 15-49 years is feeblebodied. The government is presently  grappling with the target of 22.8 crore tonnes of grain production; it needs to  reach a target of 25-26 crore tonnes by the year 2015. The situation is so grim that today every fourth malnourished global citizen is an Indian. While countless Indian citizens are condemned to sleep on empty stomachs, crores of tonnes of foodgrain rot in the country’s godowns. India has the capacity to store 415 lakh tonnes of grain in its godowns, yet 190 lakh tonnes are stored outside under thin plastic
sheets. Speedy distribution of this grain could feed many hungry Indians. Despite instructions from the Supreme Court to distribute 35 kg of foodgrain per person, only 20- 25 kg per capita is being distributed. This shortfall can be addressed by proper utilisation of grain rotting out in the open. Only lack of political and administrative will can be blamed for such debilitating ennui. Will food security bill take the targeted approach or one aimed at universalisation of food security?  If food security is considered an integral part of the fundamental right to life, how can the targeted approach even be considered? When exclusion and caste/class/ gender discrimination have been key to social, political and economic structures, how can any targeted approach address the hunger and food insecurity situation in our country  today? The present crisis of food insecurity  is due to the consistent exploitation and negligence of agriculture and the rural  sector. Even in this age of breakneck urbanisation, two-thirds of our population depend on agriculture whereas its total contribution to India’s GDP is a  dismal 17%. At the other end of the spectrum, private enterprises that are a  minuscule 1%, stake their claim to one-third of our GDP. Real food security can only be achieved through an entirely new form of polity. So, we can only hope that this National Food Security Bill will led us to Hunger to Food Security.

Saturday, July 27, 2013